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The Impact of War: New Business Networks and Small-Scale 
Contractors in Britain, 1739-1770 
  
Abstract 
 
This paper argues that the resources and skills of military contractors 
were a crucial component of the war-making capacity of the British 
state in the mid-eighteenth-century. Contractors used product 
knowledge, access to capital and credit, market intelligence, and 
personal and professional connections to effectively perform 
contracts, and by doing so contributed towards operational capability 
and combat readiness. Contracting not only reveals the diversity of 
the domestic economy but also the degree of connectivity between 
different sectors. Problems of scale, cost, and risk were overcome by 
harnessing and channelling broad expertise across different sectors. If 
modern states were highly innovative in fiscal-military terms, 
contractors were no less so in managing extensive supply operations.    
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Introduction: the contours of military contracting  
 
Recent work on naval contractors has coined the term ‘the contractor 
state’. This term represents a long-overdue scholarly recognition of 
the continuing importance of military contractors to the British state 
in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century. Earlier, in the mid-
eighteenth-century, the term is perhaps even more applicable, for state 
supply organisation was more rudimentary and private enterprise 
arguably more important. A number of factors converged to produce a 
situation whereby contractors were an integral component of the 
supply system, and clearly ‘the contractor state’ is not necessarily 
specific to one generation or one conflict.
1
 As this paper argues, 
consistent with the introductory essay, the partnership between the 
state and private enterprise was a close one, and a simple dichotomy 
between state organisation and private enterprise should be avoided. 
These interests were complementary, and closer state supervision 
often meant an increase and not a decline in the extent of military 
entrepreneurship.    
 
In Britain, for constitutional reasons, and on account of the lesser 
incidence of warfare as opposed to Continental Europe, specialist 
military contractors were not easily found. However, between 1739 
and 1770 a cohort of contractors emerged, constituting a private 
ancillary supply corps in functional if not administrative terms. The 
British state proved adept at drawing expertise from a highly-stratified 
and well-developed domestic economy. In the process, British 
military forces, and specifically in the following paper the British 
army, benefited from private capital resources and commercial 
expertise from within the domestic economy. Not only the 
‘Contractor State’ but also the ‘sub-contractor state’ operated in 
tandem with the ‘fiscal-military state’, and the harmony of interests 
between private profit and public service proved essential to the 
operational efficiency of the British army. 
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In recent years, our understanding of the contours of the eighteenth-
century British ‘fiscal-military state’ has been enlarged by the 
emergence of a more nuanced version of John Brewer’s concept. 
Recent studies have shifted the analysis from the state’s tax-raising 
abilities towards its spending commitments and priorities. Defence 
expenditure and the administration attending the conduct of war, the 
‘military’ element of the state, is now attracting scholarly attention. 
The efficiency of that state apparatus in partnership with private 
enterprise is a central theme of recent work on the Royal Navy. As 
Knight and Wilcox point out: “Private-sector involvement was 
crucial, but it needed to be delineated clearly and managed effectively 
both by those on the spot and by administrators in London”.
2
 
 
For the eighteenth-century army, the absence of a commissarial 
structure meant that much vital work was conducted under contract, 
albeit with a modicum of state oversight and monitoring. Parrott has 
shown how war in the seventeenth century incorporated ‘complex 
calculations of potential profit, systems of credit, and extensive 
networks of sub-contractors’.
3
 The great contractors of the 
seventeenth century, in the guise of proprietary colonels controlling 
the chain of resource allocation, were in decline though not 
completely defunct by the eighteenth century.
4
 Regimental ownership 
was an important element of continuity in the management of armies 
long after the mid-seventeenth-century.
5
 Contracts with private 
suppliers had existed for centuries but terminological differences 
between regimental colonel-proprietors and civilian contractors were 
differences of substance and not just nomenclature.
6
 The legacy of 
this system was variable, but in Britain (arguably outside the 
mainstream military enterprise tradition) while there was a shift from 
military to civilian personnel, colonels retained regimental privileges.  
 
The financial ‘business of the regiment’ was an intricate affair, with 
stoppages from pay levied for clothing, forage, and other 
contingencies, and arcane regulations and calculations surrounding 
the remaining soldiers’ pay, known as ‘Off-Reckonings’.
7
 On behalf 
of colonels, regimental agents made contracts with clothiers or 
5 
 
secured contracts themselves.
8
 Colonels and regimental agents 
retained the ability to accrue considerable wealth, and the latter group, 
including most notably John Calcraft, with an estimated fortune of 
£250,000 (Gentleman’s Magazine 42 (1772), 392), became very 
wealthy. Supply on a regimental basis illustrates the persistence of 
decentralization and the retention of authority and privileges of 
established institutions and elites.
9
 
 
Contractors made agreements with government departments but were 
allowed considerable latitude in meeting the contract terms, by 
organising procurement, delivery and distribution, and had to use their 
market knowledge and connections to deliver the standards, quantities 
and quality required at the times stipulated.
10
 For the government, 
private contracting offered wider access to a range of markets which 
government officials would have found incredibly difficult if not 
impossible to organise. Those perennial operational supply problems, 
of accessing technical expertise and specialist skills in manufacturing, 
supply and transport, were powerful technical and financial 
imperatives. In these terms, the use of contractors was over-
determined, for as Parrott has asserted, the state could access ‘a large-
scale, diverse, and efficient system of manufacturing and supply 
without having to capitalize its structure and operations on any 
significant scale, as would have been the case if the decision had been 
taken to establish a supply corps’.
11
 
 
Out-sourcing of supply always raised the risk of fraud and corruption, 
and there was always ‘Country’ opposition to brokers, loan 
merchants, and contractors ‘tax-eating’ beneficiaries of a bloated state 
apparatus. The tendency to view contractors as uniformly rapacious 
and/or corrupt often arose from criticism of those whose wealth 
marked them as vulgar parvenus and as the unacceptable face of 
‘new wealth.’ Combined with absurd pre-Weberian bureaucratic 
organisation practices and the survival of antiquated medieval 
offices as a vehicle for sinecures, fees, and patronage, it is easy to 
see contractors as part of a parasitic political system of ‘Old 
Corruption’ with personal gain, self-interest, and aggrandisement 
as defining features of the eighteenth-century state.
12
 Yet as the 
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introductory essay indicates, in assuming risk, organising supply on 
an often vast scale, creating supply networks, and creating 
employment, contractors acted as quintessentially eighteenth-century 
capitalists. Moreover, it was not a select band of elite financiers and 
merchants who were the beneficiaries of the military supply system, 
for as the following essay argues, war supply was well-integrated with 
and drew upon many different sectors of the British economy. This 
much is clear from the extensive sub-contracting which underpinned 
the performance of so many extensive contracts. The ‘hidden wiring’ 
of sub-contracting was in many ways the vitally important element in 
the successful performance of many contracts, and indeed far more 
characteristic and important to the entire system than the well-
documented examples of fraud and sharp practice.      
 
British experience and exceptionalism  
 
Earlier in the eighteenth century, during the War of Spanish 
Succession, the great specialists, primarily Sephardic Jews, having 
served in the same capacity in the final quarter of the seventeenth 
century, were employed by William III, in supplying bread, wagons 
and forage to the army.
13
 Yet Britain diverged somewhat from the 
model of contract-making which informed the position of the 
Munitionnaires in France. While central negotiation of contracts, 
leaving considerable scope for the arrangements surrounding contract 
performance, was broadly similar, there were important differences. 
While many officers complained about the onerous administrative 
duties attached to making contracts, especially abroad, difficulties 
were largely overcome by close liaison between officers, government 
officials, and contractors.
14
 Moreover, problems of inefficiency, lack 
of accountability, and a fundamental ignorance of actual conditions 
which blighted centrally-arranged contracts, appear less apparent in 
Britain. By providing an interface where military officers and 
commissarial officials performed their tasks in providing guidance 
and oversight, the government ensured accountability, frugality, and 
cost-effectiveness underpinned the construction and performance of 
contracts.
15
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Larger armies, higher expenditure and a prolonged period of conflict 
were essential prerequisites towards a more pronounced use of 
civilian contractors.
16
 By the mid-eighteenth century, the commercial 
profile and socio-economic status of contractors was much more 
diverse than previously. The challenge for government was to find a 
suitable array of contractors who could supply the army in a timely, 
reliable, and efficient manner. Economic function was closely linked 
to socio-economic status; wealthy London merchants and financiers 
conducted contracts for remittances and provisions to garrisoned 
troops abroad. When the army was on active campaign or in domestic 
camps, a different type of contractor, typically men engaged in 
domestic agricultural occupations, including farmers, horse-dealers, 
grain merchants, and even bakers and millers, came to the fore to 
supply bread, wood, straw, and forage.
17
 This diversity was perhaps a 
case of British exceptionalism, arising from the intricacies of a 
highly-stratified, integrative economy. As early as the 1720s, Daniel 
Defoe noted how the growth of London food markets had encouraged 
regional specialisation. Certainly, by the mid-eighteenth century, the 
ability of producers to cooperate, coordinate, and exchange was 
facilitated by sophisticated financial institutions and instruments, and 
a well-developed transport network, and infrastructure. These factors 
allowed room for those lower down the economic scale to contribute 
to the supply system.  
 
Despite, or perhaps because of, the multi-faceted nature of 
contracting, only relatively recently have attempts been made to 
examine these sectors.
18
 These studies have demonstrated difficulties 
that could beset the actual performance of contracts, while also 
identifying contractors in this sector as from a different social milieu 
from London financiers and merchants. Equally, the importance of 
sub-contracting has now been recognised as common for all contracts, 
and acknowledgment of this often shadowy world indicates that 
military contracting encompassed a wide range of personnel including 
agents, tradesmen, and labourers. Operations including procurement, 
shipping, transportation, and food supply, necessitated extensive 
business contacts and diverse expertise. The financial rewards may or 
may not have been commensurate with the time, effort, and expertise 
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expended, but any attempt to generalise as to profit margins or to 
impose a pattern of expected profitability is likely to be inaccurate. 
Contracting was a very diverse activity, with many highly variable 
factors affecting profitability. Sub-contracting was conducted on a 
bewilderingly wide scale, and while account books are scarce, the 
records of commissaries indicate the great variety and number of 
suppliers and the complex and layered functions involved in military 
supply.
19
 An alternative focus of study which illustrates a similar 
process has been recounted by Bowen, who has shown how the 
growth of the East India Company from the mid-eighteenth century 
fuelled expansive opportunities to a wide variety of merchants, naval 
suppliers, tradesmen, and artisans throughout Britain. The Company 
utilised pre-existing supply networks to forge a high degree of 
integration with the British economy and in the process the livelihood 
of tens of thousands of people within Britain became linked to if not 
dependent on the fortunes of the Company.
20
  
  
Similar processes were at work in the supply of the British army. 
Military contracts made an impressive impact on many sectors and 
individuals. In terms of performance all contracts contained four key 
elements: Production, Procurement, Transportation, and Distribution, 
and all these elements required a skill-set based on logistical and 
organisational prowess and the fundamental ability to coordinate and 
manage supply operations. Taking for example the 1756 contract for 
encampments in Southern England allows us to examine the functions 
and responsibilities of contractors, the scale of operations and the 
degree of commissarial oversight. The administrative structure was 
well-defined with a highly-refined staff structure which incorporated 
a proportionate degree of accountability and transparency. This was 
all the more impressive since the efficiency of the hastily-organized 
supply organisation largely depended on the appointment of 
responsible and skilled personnel, rather than merely adapting a pre-
existing organisation.  
 
Abraham Hume was appointed Commissary-General responsible for 
overall administration and supervision of encampments.
21
 Under 
Hume were two Deputies who superintended and directed Under-
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Deputies, and also visited camps to monitor activity—the 
appointments were considered by the Treasury and approved by the 
Duke of Cumberland. The Under Deputies’ tasks consisted of 
inspecting magazines, assessing the quality of provisions, and 
ensuring that the quantity contracted for had been supplied.
22
 
Difficulties were compounded by the fact that the 1756 encampment 
contract was the first of the war, and administrative regulations 
governing provision of supplies were rather unclear. Moreover, the 
presence of Hessian troops created further complications in terms of 
particular demands.
23
 As with troop transports held in readiness and 
fleets stationed in home waters and the Mediterranean, camps were 
called into being to deal with the invasion threat of 1756. As the year 
progressed and no invasion materialized, their military value and 
financial cost became an issue. The Duke of Bedford questioned 
Henry Fox as to why troops were ‘not sent somewhere or other to 
attack the Enemy in some part where an impression might be made’.
24
 
In the event, owing to vicissitudes in troop movement and official 
caution, there was a considerable surplus which was a positive 
indication of the capacity of the public-private partnership of 
government and contractors to meet demands.
25
 Contractors and 
commissaries were part of the multi-agency approach, essentially 
private supply with ‘some central administrative oversight’ which 
successfully utilized and harnessed pre-existing skills from within the 
domestic economy.
26
  
 
Mass mobilisation of widely-dispersed troops posed unprecedented 
challenges for the British state, and necessitated a high degree of 
coordination, cooperation and delegation of authority in organising 
supply operations. The state apparatus was diffuse, supply 
organisation flexible, and supply methods mixed. The number of 
troops supplied, their location, troop density relative to location, and 
the agricultural productivity of the hinterland all had to be considered 
in arriving at a resolution on supply methods. In the absence of 
contractors obtaining goods from a wider geographical area to supply 
concentrated forces, predictable shortages and the dislocation of local 
economies arose. In Scotland in 1746, difficulties procuring horses 
and wagons from the town of Perth forced the military authorities to 
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resort to the more economically-developed Edinburgh.
27
 Similar 
difficulties were encountered during the same campaign in remote 
Highland locations with bread shortages only prevented by the 
foresight of the Duke of Cumberland whose expertise as a ‘Providore’ 
was duly if rather unctuously noted by other officers.
28
     
  
Local economic dislocation was not uncommon. Travelling through 
southern England in 1756, the British army officer James Wolfe 
informed his mother: ‘We have ruined half the public houses upon the 
march, because they have quartered us in villages too poor to feed us 
without destruction to themselves.’
29
 Similarly, in Germany in 1758, 
amid confused objectives and demarcation of authority, a lack of 
foresight to anticipate shortages resulted in forcible seizure of forage 
from peasants.
30
 These incidents, far from uncommon, indicated that 
mid-eighteenth-century armies were becoming too large to be 
supplied by traditional methods of local procurement, and the 
depredations of ‘living off the country’ explain why locals often 
feared approaching armies and hid ‘every portable consumable.’
31
 As 
Lord Hardwicke informed Joseph Yorke, ‘we understand very well 
sacks to forage corn in to be a kind of thieving utensil legitimated by 
the practice of war.’
32
  
 
The scale of military expenditure in the years before and after the 
extensive mobilization of the Seven Years War provides some 
indication of escalating demands and the difficulties in providing for a 
larger number of troops. As Table 1 demonstrates, there was a great 
need for such expertise. 
 
Table 1. Expenditure on Great Britain’s armed forces 1750-1764 
(select years)  
 Armed 
Forces 
Navy Ordnance Total 
1750 £1,338,095 £1,384,747 £227,520 £2,950,362 
1755 £1,399,391 £1,814,324 £177,139 £3,390,854 
1760 £8,249,277 £4,538,651 £681,793 £13,469,721 
1764 £2,233,552 £2,149,693 £278,678 £4,661,923 
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Figures (rounded off) extracted from Parliamentary Papers, 1868-
1869, Volume XXXV (I) Public Income and Expenditure 
 
During the war, some detected a favourable shift in popular opinion 
towards the army, though the extent of anti-militarism outside of the 
British political classes has perhaps been exaggerated. One 
pamphleteer noted in 1760: 
 
‘I own indeed that amidst the Dangers of this War, and the Threats 
of an Invasion, the vast army now on our Establishment, is 
necessary: But what I lament is to see the Sentiments of the Nation 
so amazingly reconciled to the Prospect of having a far more 
numerous Body of regular Troops, kept up, after the Peace, than 
any true Lover of his country in former Times thought, could be 
allowed without endangering the Constitution’.
33
       
 
Nevertheless, the expense of the mid-century wars led to calls for 
retrenchment after 1763. Yet, while peacetime military expenditure 
remained higher than previously, a convincing case was made that the 
increase had to be offset against savings made from the reduced 
number of men, and by lower contract prices.
34
 Sober and well-
informed counsels such as Charles Jenkinson offered a judicious 
analysis and explanation of the heightened expenditure:  
 
‘If it be asked why expences of this sort were less during King 
Williams Wars & the War for the Spanish Succession than in the 
two last Wars I answer that in the first place the Dutch had the 
whole management of this Businesss, [sic] in some instances they 
bore the whole of the expence … a great part was also paid by 
Contributions drawn from the Enemies Country, another reason 
was that the War was nearer at Home & therefore was more under 
the Inspection of the Treasury & the Government of the Country, 
but when we became principals in the War, & these Wars were 
carried on at a great distance it was then that these expences 
swelled to the enormous amount that We have seen of late, as a 
proof how much distance opperates in Cases of this nature’
35
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Higher costs inevitably followed from more extensive and intense 
warfare, undoubtedly exacerbated by Parliamentary control of 
military finance after 1688 which ensured sharp increases in wartime 
expenditure. The Navy remained the senior military service, and naval 
organization was characterized by clear spheres of authority and 
precise demarcation of functions and responsibilities. While the 
Treasury regulated funds issued to the Navy, they neither questioned 
its allocation or level of expenditure
36
 The situation was different for 
the army, for unlike the large European standing armies, the army 
laboured under constitutional and institutional limitations which lent a 
makeshift, irregular, and informal character to many of its processes 
and operations, including its supply system.
37
 
 
Outside of ‘military’ suppliers of weaponry and gunpowder, 
government proved adept at utilizing pre-existing sectors which were 
closely integrated within the domestic economy. While meaningful, 
the notion of ‘military’ and ‘non-military’ supplies does not 
adequately convey the extent to which they were connected. For 
example, providing gunpowder called for the logistical and 
transportation expertise and infrastructure of other domestic sectors.
38
 
The prospect of profitability was inevitably attractive, and indeed 
essential, if men were to risk capital and reputation. Scale and volume 
posed challenges ultimately overcome by expertise, specialization, 
intricate business networks, and the inter-connected nature of many 
sectors. While military needs were more episodic than the Navy, the 
temporary nature of military supply allows us to capture something of 
its evolution, and to identify those involved as well as locating their 
socio-economic position, sector and function.  
Contractors and military efficiency  
 
Historians have long recognized that contractors were a crucial 
component of the war-making capacity of the state.
39
 In terms of 
scale, they were perhaps the greatest ‘middlemen’ of the eighteenth 
century. Trust in the creditworthiness, ability, and character were 
important factors in awarding contracts. Equally, patronage, clientage, 
and political cronyism could also influence, often decisively, the 
13 
 
appointment of contractors.
40
 For government, risk-aversion was the 
uppermost consideration when negotiating contracts, and terms and 
conditions were carefully-constructed to ensure contractors were 
responsible for all uncertainties and vagaries, including heightened 
costs. Indeed, risk applied not only during performance of a contract. 
Contractors bore the risk of over-stocking, and subsequent loss, which 
might need to be sold in a glutted, post-war market after 
demobilization. The need for rapid movement between peace-time 
establishments and wartime military mobilization ensured contracting 
represented the most efficient means to achieve this transformation.
41
 
The transition from war to peace often proved difficult for 
contractors, especially given the government’s eagerness to re-
negotiate contracts with the return of peace. At the end of the Seven 
Years War, one contractor complained of suffering caused by contract 
terms and ‘most uncommon and unforeseen events.’
42
 Ultimately, 
given the state of economic development, and the considerable risks 
and disincentives attached to state assumption of responsibilities for 
the military apparatus, private contracting represented the most 
rational and effective supply method in the mid-eighteenth-century. 
 
Sir Lewis Namier famously related how ‘Fortunes were made and the 
greatness of families founded in army magazines and bread 
waggons’.
43
 In fact, many contractors, especially merchants 
possessing financial and victualling contracts for foreign garrisons, 
were already wealthy and financially and politically well-connected 
before they engaged in military contracting. Proximity to metropolitan 
political authority was one reason why contractors tended to be men 
with London connections, but pre-existing wealth was equally 
important. The procedures for tendering proposals aimed at testing 
applicants’ viability, respectability and integrity. A combination of 
practical ability, commercial experience, and personal respectability 
and creditworthiness were required to secure contracts, which 
introduced an inherent bias towards London merchants who most 
readily possessed the requisite attributes, as well as other advantages 
such as geographic location and political connection.
44
 Given the 
nature of eighteenth-century political culture, none of this is 
particularly surprising. Clearly, the performance of vital military 
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services by inexperienced people predominantly seeking political and 
social advancement was not the happiest conjunction of factors. Yet, 
despite the prevalent culture of clientage and patronage, care was 
taken to award contracts only to those who possessed the ability to 
perform them, and patronage was rarely the only factor in awarding 
contracts.
45
  
 
The competent, honest, and diligent performance of contracts was a 
major concern for government. Opportunities for fraud and collusion 
existed but allegations of malpractice and financial irregularities were 
investigated thoroughly, accounts were audited carefully, and 
penalties and sanctions applied if abuses were discovered. The 
Comptrollers of Army Accounts was established in 1703 ‘to keep an 
Account of all Money issued from the Exchequer to the Paymaster 
General of the Forces; register the uses to which it was to be applied, 
and examine the Vouchers and acquittances justifying the payments 
made by him’.
46
 Fraud allegations were also investigated by other 
government departments connected to Army, Navy and Ordnance and 
while there was substance to some allegations, many were found to be 
vexatious and motivated by envy and jealousy.
47
 Not content to leave 
such important matters to officials, Ministers themselves became 
concerned, with the Duke of Newcastle and William Pitt well aware 
of the political significance of contract performance, especially where 
clientage relationships were involved, with Pitt even allegedly 
threatening Newcastle with impeachment if provisions or money were 
deficient.
48
 If political influence featured in awarding garrison 
contracts, ‘sharp practice’ in the form of manipulation of competitive 
tendering could also be problematic. Advertisement promoted 
competition for encampment contracts and introduced unpredictable 
elements into the procedure.
49
 While the Treasury was intent on 
awarding the contract to the lowest bidder, pending adequate security 
clearance via sureties, potential contractors had to submit applications 
which were realistic: securing an unprofitable contract was a prospect 
which had to be avoided.
50
 
  
While many of the most lucrative contracts were held by financiers 
and merchants, contracting required inputs from many other sectors. 
15 
 
Possessing a more humble but nevertheless respectable status 
encompassing a modicum of pre-existing wealth were those like 
Richard Oswald whose broad mercantile portfolio included financial, 
colonial, and shipping interests—as with other merchants, contracting 
was a profitable sideline which contributed to but was not the main 
component of his wealth.
51
 For remittance and victualling contracts, 
expertise in resource allocation and in accessing capital and credit 
might be sufficient but political connections could be useful and in 
some cases were necessary. However, for trade-related contracts 
where work was partially conducted or at least closely-coordinated by 
the contractor they were far less important. Further down the social 
scale were perhaps those closest to Namier’s description, with 
farmers, millers, and others keen to extend their activities from the 
base of their primary business. For the domestic camps of the early 
1740s, a joint proposal to supply Hounslow Heath camp, made by two 
bakers, a miller, a mealman, and corn chandler reveals the integrative 
aspects of related but separate occupations, and the applicants’ 
readiness to cooperate and assume responsibility for a large contract 
indicates the existence of considerable confidence among men in this 
sector.
52
  
Sub-contractors: the hidden wiring of military contracts 
 
In the area of sub-contracting one can find relevant and convincing 
evidence for the impact of war in expanding commercial operations. 
Victualling contractors used a large number of suppliers acting as 
sub-contractors as part of their routine wholesale and retail business. 
Given the weekly rations for troops, including a range of products like 
bread, beef, peas, butter, and flour, it could be no other way.
53
 That 
was nothing new, for similar practices were evident in earlier wars. 
What was notably different in the mid-century wars was the closer 
cooperation and coordination between merchants and tradesman, and 
the capability of men lower down the social scale to perform 
extensive contracts. Given the scale of tasks involved, the vibrancy 
and cross-fertilization of skills, innovation and personal connections 
across and within various sectors of the domestic economy is fully 
apparent.  
16 
 
 
Horse dealers and the transportation industry are a case in point. The 
raising of large number of troops meant transport infrastructure must 
be improved. In September 1756, the London Evening Post 
reported a ‘great Number of Horses were bought at Newbury Fair 
for the Use of the Government.’ (4-7 Sept. 1756). A month earlier, 
an advertisement requested any ‘Countrymen’ formerly 
apprenticed to smiths and farriers to contact the Friendly Society 
of Master Farriers where they would be ‘immediately employed.’  
(London Evening Post, 29-31 July 1756). With no Government 
studs, horses, even for cavalry and dragoon regiments, were 
procured on the open market.
54
 Horses were clearly a vital 
component of the pre-industrial economy and the military machine 
but it was also the case that men skilled in horseflesh enjoyed a 
degree of scarcity value and were highly-esteemed. The need for 
skilled men becomes readily apparent, given the estimate of an 
eightfold increase in horses in London between 1752 and 1765.
55
 
As the St. James’s Chronicle for 29-31 March 1764 reported, an 
estimated 6,000 quarters of oats were consumed weekly by 
approximately 32,000 horses in London in 1764. Reputable mid-
century estimates, most notably William Owen’s An Authentic 
Account published by the King’s Authority, of all the Fairs in 
England and Wales (1756) demonstrate the thriving nature of the 
trade, with approximately 42% of the 3,200 fairs including 
horses.
56
 The emergence of great London horse repositories, as 
reported by the London Evening Post (2-5 April 1757) was another 
sign of vibrancy though in other respects the trade retained many 
earlier traits, notably the prevalence of partnerships.
57
  
The contrast between horse contracts and victualling contracts is 
striking, for whereas victualling contractors’ co-ordinated supply, 
the supply of horses was in the hands of specialist dealers in 
London, and procurement could be problematic for those outside 
those circles.
58
 There was a distinct community of London horse-
dealers, and partnerships among them were common and almost 
certainly necessary to meet demand; for example, John Warrington 
and William Baldwin supplied horses for the Artillery Train in 
England between 1755 and 1757. Initially supplying one hundred 
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and thirty horses, the number rose to five hundred after a rapid 
escalation in mobilization. This contract was made by private 
approaches, a method not dissimilar to victualling contracts, since 
the leading horse-dealers were well-known, obviating any need for 
advertisement. George Grisewood and John Warrington supplied 
horses in Germany and French coastal expeditions as well as the 
Artillery Train between 1760 and 1762, where horses moved 
entrenching tools, artillery guns, and ammunition. Warrington was 
the named contractor but five others, William Hollamby, John 
Benson, George Grisewood, John Willan, and Joseph Gibson also 
supplied horses. Several of these men were substantial 
businessmen working in the nexus between horse-racing, horse-
breeding, inn-keeping and mail-coach operations.
59
 
 
Cooperation, collaboration, and coordination were essential to 
meet heightened demand. Over the wartime period, one thousand 
seven hundred and ninety two horses were provided between 1756 
and 1762.
60
 With skills in product knowledge and resource 
allocation, horse-dealers also sought involvement in supplying 
camps, with John Warrington submitting numerous proposals 
throughout the war.
61
 The farmer and horse-dealer John Willan 
made an unsuccessful proposal to supply wood and straw in 
1757.
62
 In estimating rations and delivery times, the proposal 
suggested familiarity with supply operations but since 
governmental priorities were cheapness and the ability to supply 
all articles to all camps, Willan did not obtain the contract. In 1759 
he was awarded the contract after meeting these criteria. The 
extensive contract consisted of supplying 215,167 loaves of bread, 
55,394 rations of wood and straw, and 310,536 rations of hay and 
oats. In addition, upwards of eighty wagons, three hundred and 
thirty-six horses and eighty-four drivers were employed over the 
period 19 July 1759-6 June 1760.
63
  
 
The business life of John Willan not only demonstrates the important 
practical and financial legacy of family connection in the eighteenth 
century, but more pertinently illustrates close business networks in 
London based on inter-related interests in coaching inns, horses, 
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farming, and military supply. Those standing surety for Willan’s 
1759 contract worked in the same sector. William Baldwin was a 
partner in the contract for artillery horses of 1755-7, while William 
Godfrey was a commissary responsible for procuring wood and 
straw in 1756-7.
64
 By 1756 Willan had acquired farming land, 
stables, and residence on the Grosvenor Estate, and while 
successful, was not notably or ostentatiously wealthy.
65
 After 
1760, he acquired land at Marylebone Park and Hornsey Wood 
which allowed him to continue his business and help his nephew, 
also John Willan, to build a successful mail-coach business from 
the Bull and Mouth Inn, London.
66
 More widely, Willan’s 
participation in encampment contracts was followed by others 
engaged in agriculture. The contractors in 1761, John Boghurst and 
John Martyr, were Kent yeomen farmers while Samuel 
Tewkesbury, the contractor in 1762, was a Winchester farmer who 
had leased land for camps throughout the war.
67
 The large number 
of proposals for encampment contracts is testimony to the vibrancy of 
local sources of supply, and the confidence of local tradesmen in their 
capability in resource procurement, allocation, and distribution.  
 
Sub-contracting and the business networks which provided the 
infrastructure for it were complemented by partnerships, which 
were a way of spreading risk, procuring wider access to capital 
reserves, and utilising expertise, knowledge, and connections in a 
mutually-beneficial way. Most remittance and victualling contracts 
were performed by partnerships, for, despite diminishing profit 
margins, partnerships augmented capital and reduced the risk of 
potentially catastrophic losses. It was also a sensible strategy for 
government not to tightly over-concentrate contracts in a small 
number of hands.
68
 Partnerships were particularly suitable for 
merchants whose trading connections were primarily attached to 
particular parts of the world, with Gibraltar, Portugal, and North 
America particularly notable.
69
  
 
Similar financial imperatives underpinned contracts for the army in 
encampments or on campaign. With the outbreak of hostilities in 
1756 Lawrence Dundas, after successfully conducting supply 
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operations in Scotland and Flanders in the 1740s, renewed his 
career in military supply.
70
 Dundas worked alongside Robert 
Haldane, an East India Captain, and Richard Oswald, a London 
merchant, in supplying English encampments.
71
 Oswald was the 
named contractor but the contract was performed by all three men, 
part of a wider network of Scottish merchants in London, in 
partnership.
72
 While Oswald, Haldane, Hume and Dundas worked in 
the same sector, the Scottish element in domestic contracting did not 
arise from favouritism as John Wilkes and others suggested, but 
emanated from experience, knowledge, and practical ability. Close 
business relationships were also indicative of a degree of clannishness 
among Scottish merchants in London. While this particular 
collaboration later broke down amid personal discord and legal 
dispute, with Dundas stating his determination ‘never to have 
Partners’, for merchants conducting larger, more capital-intensive 
ventures, partnerships had considerable value.
73
  
 
Sub-contracting and partnerships were essential features in the multi-
faceted configuration of contacting. Yet, together with the 
competition surrounding the award of contracts, these arrangements 
can often make contracting appear as cloak-and-dagger affairs. 
Unfortunately for historians, it seems likely many agreements were 
verbal, informal, or unorthodox, and therefore unrecorded. Yet 
enough evidence has emerged to show the complexity of contracting, 
for, behind a simple agreement between a government department and 
named signatories were a host of agents, correspondents, suppliers, 
assistants, and labourers. From the impressively broad reach of those 
involved, from horse-dealers and farmers to bakers and millers, it 
seems clear that a broad range of economic sectors participated in 
military supply. The various influences on the allocation and conduct 
of contracts should induce caution when assessing credibility, value, 
and performance. 
Wealth, status, and economic legacy   
 
The acquisition of wealth and status, the commercial spoils of war, 
led to variable results. For some, like Richard Oswald, activity in 
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philanthropic and charitable work aimed at aiding the local economy 
and improving the physical environment.
74
 Others flaunted their 
wealth more ostentatiously, purchasing country estates and seeking 
the approbation of landed society. Obtaining art collections and fine 
furnishings was common, and broad gradations of wealth or at least 
conspicuous consumption can be gleaned from taxation of luxury 
items.
75
 Personal advancement in this way was not necessarily akin to 
naked self-interest at the expense of the nation, of seizing the ‘vitals’ 
of the nation, as numerous polemical pamphleteers claimed. Many 
contractors possessed a diverse commercial portfolio, and mercantile 
involvement in nascent industrial projects was common, often 
following exploitation of the resources of landed estates. This form of 
activity was frequently a post-opulence strategy to spread risk by 
channelling investment away from often hazardous overseas 
ventures.
76
  
 
National economic development does not appear to have been 
damaged by the recurrent warfare of the mid-eighteenth-century. 
Despite unprecedented demand for money and the continuing rise in 
the National Debt caused by successive wars, interest rates remained 
low, and government loans continued to be successfully floated.
77
 The 
obvious counter-factual is one which stresses that without war the 
economy would have performed better. There is no reliable way of 
quantitatively testing this claim. For the purposes of assessing the 
impact of war, it seems clear that industrial development continued 
and few infant industries suffered as a result of conflict. While 
warfare always disrupted commerce to some extent, measures to curb 
losses, like convoys, were fairly successful. Similarly, local economic 
dislocations and the variable fortunes of different sectors should not 
be taken as indicative of an economy distorted by military activity. In 
terms of real wages, foreign trade, and non-military investment, a 
good case can be made for viewing the stimulus given to demands for 
military materials having only a marginal impact, with little 
contraction of other forms of economic activity. Throughout the war, 
metal industries developed and expanded, manpower resources were 
enhanced by troops from the Celtic fringe, debtors, criminals, and 
colonists, and finance was continually available.
78
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The personal wealth accrued by contractors was important as a means 
of attaining gentrification and upward social mobility, and in this 
process there were clear economic gains. While acerbic political 
comment castigated contractors for profiteering and inordinate 
financial gain at the expense of army and nation, it is apparent that 
this was far too simplistic a view. Social and economic prejudices 
coloured and tainted the views of political observers and social 
commentators. Equally, evidence of economic vibrancy generated by 
contracting undermines the view that war was necessarily an 
unproductive form of economic activity. The major problem in 
assessing the nature and extent of sub-contracting is evidential. 
Contractors’ business records are scarce, inevitably leading to gaps in 
our knowledge relating to profitability, the relative importance of 
contracts within business portfolios, and the extent of sub-contracting 
across different sectors. While unjustifiable to claim that war was a 
beneficial influence in the development of the British economy in the 
eighteenth century, it can be suggested that the prevalent warfare of 
the period did not act as a brake on economic activity or the 
development of the infrastructure of an emerging industrial 
economy.
79
 Additionally, wealth accrued from contracts often aided 
fledging industries and provided further capital for foreign and 
domestic investment.  
 
While statistical data on capital formation and investment during war 
and peace in the eighteenth century is unlikely to be more than 
guesstimates, considerable empirical evidence exists as to the extent 
of economic development and industrial growth. For Adam Smith by 
1776, ‘the progress of manufactures, and the improvement in the art 
of war’ rendered it impossible for troops to maintain themselves in the 
field.
80
 This bracketing together of economic development and 
military organisation underpinning reconfiguration of the relationship 
between the state, private enterprise, and military forces, was 
perceptive but controversial. Indeed, one of Smith’s later acolytes, 
Richard Cobden, argued that military expenditure undermined the 
development of peacetime commerce. For Cobden, warfare subverted 
economic growth by diverting savings into taxes and debts in order to 
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pay for unproductive military operations.
81
 As a recent writer has 
pointed out, this interpretation distorts Smith’s view that while the 
labour of the armed forces was unproductive, the labour of arms 
manufacturers and other private sector suppliers was productive, as it 
replaced itself and made a profit.
82
 While the destructive capacity of 
war, even in earlier periods, should not be discounted, eighteenth-
century warfare was still a long way from the twentieth-century 
model of total war, mass mobilisation, and widespread destruction. 
Localised in geographical extent, limited in scope, and concentrated 
in nature may be a more accurate characterisation.  
 
The episodic nature of military activity meant the impact of military 
spending fluctuated, and was often highly localised when fixed on 
garrisons and barracks, and temporary when based on the transient 
use of resources and services. However, in terms of individual wealth 
and industrial development there was clearly a more long-standing 
influence. Greater integration between the state and private 
individuals, a higher degree of administrative rigour, and greater 
familiarity and capability towards large-scale operations were notable 
features. While technological progress was not particularly marked, 
traditional and modern techniques co-existed within many sectors and 
production methods evolved which combined pre-existing 
specialisation with technological innovation. Equally, although wars 
may not contribute towards economic growth in any direct or 
systematic way, what they tend to reveal is the extent of economic 
capability and capacity. The impressive range and scale of 
commercial activity was indicative of an expanding capitalist 
economy, drawing on traditional processes and practices while also 
utilising innovative financial instruments and harnessing 
technological advances. These diverse skills and practices reveal the 
complex skein of rural and urban resources within a highly-stratified 
economy. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The endurance and strength of the ‘contractor state’ largely rested on 
its responsiveness to the unpredictability and unforeseen demands of 
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wartime. The expertise which the British state could draw upon was 
indicative of the vibrant nature of highly-productive agricultural 
economy and a rapidly-developing proto-industrial economy. 
Improvements in production and distribution, alongside moderate 
technological progress facilitated more efficient supply methods. Yet 
the human element was perhaps the most important of all, for only 
with expertise in coordination, planning and execution could the 
different elements involved in contracting be made to work together. 
Behind every contract was a myriad of people, trades, processes, and 
techniques. The named contractor acted as the coordinator, facilitator 
and middleman, but the largely hidden world of sub-contracting 
reveals many men who were diligent and who used their 
considerable expertise in the service of the state. The economic 
interests of many contractors were surprisingly diversified, 
encompassing traditional agricultural pursuits, high finance, and 
infant industrialism. While it cannot be denied that contracts were 
often lucrative and were often a means of social advancement, they 
were not sinecures, and skilled work based on knowledge and 
experience was necessary to their performance. From the vantage-
point of the early twenty-first century, the British supply system of 
the eighteenth-century appears to have been characterised by an 
intelligent use of available resources, and decidedly modern in its 
rigorous and rational approach to resource allocation and distribution.         
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